Irc why use ssl

The encryption protocol will be referred to in this document as TLS. In its most basic form, each user has a pair of keys, one public, and one private. A single user will share their public key and keep secret their private key.

The user will thus acquire many public keys and have one private key. A full discussion of TLS and its X. This document will use irssi , weechat should be similar. Hello, i read your blog from time to time and i own a similar one and i was just curious if you get a lot of spam comments?

If so how do you stop it, any plugin or anything you can advise? You must proceed your writing. Your email address will not be published. OTR Off-the-Record Messaging OTR project homepage is a protocol that provides encryption , authentication , deniability and perfect forward secrecy for instant messaging chat sessions.

You can authenticate each other in 3 different ways, remembering that the best way to verify a key fingerprint or share a secret for authentication is to meet face to face or through encrypted email GPG : 1. Use a shared secret that you both know. Ask a question you can assume the other person answer correctly.

Trust manually the person. Hammond had also mentioned in chat that he had been busted for pot possession. All they had to do was look through the usual suspects, who lived within the midwestern United States, and who had recently been arrested for unlawful possession. I like to use this case to demonstrate to people that little scraps of unimportant data can be combined to identify someone.

The reasons presented for not doing it is only an attempt at justifying the first part "they havent gotten around to it yet". Sometimes steps toward security are better than no steps toward security. If the underlying protocol is fundamentally untrustworthy, that's another problem as needs addressing.

For small working groups that all trust each other example: a network engineering team at an ISP with a bastion host that everyone needs to SSH into before accessing anything else , a really easy solution is to run an ircd that only listens on Is there any reason the certificates can't be signed by a valid certificate authority as they should be for HTTPS sites?

Until recently, getting certificates that would work for IRC purposes has been rather difficult. Since individual IRC servers are usually available via multiple hostnames, it requires very expensive certificates e.

DNS records. Your options consisted of getting a "Subject Alternative Name" cert with all of these subdomains, or getting a very expensive wildcard certificate.

It's theoretically possible to deploy Let's Encrypt now for IRC servers, which removes the cost issue. The new problems become the automated creation and deployment of IRC server certificates. Using DNS means you'll need to write code to interface with your DNS server, which also means securing that interaction so other people can't modify your DNS records and get signed certs for your domain as well. I actually manage the signed certificates for one of the IRC networks I'm an administrator for.

Our two blockers for deploying Let's Encrypt are the aforementioned challenges with DNS, and the fact that our software currently validates server-to-server links using the fingerprint of each server's individual certificate, hardcoded into the configuration file. If we're switching certs every 3 months, we'll need some way to either distribute certificate configuration more efficiently or we'll need to change the ircd to verify the certificate chain instead of the fingerprint.

FWIW, our current deployment of signed certs is the "one cert to rule them all" deployed to all servers on our network. This is definitely not ideal, but it's by far the cheapest and easiest option prior to Let's Encrypt. If dns is currently a blocker for you, and you're willing to run a HTTPd on each server, there might be another option: Redirect all challenge requests i. That way, you can run the client on verification.

The verification server can then distribute the certificates and keys to your nodes. That's one of the recommended solutions for shared-hosting providers who don't want to use DNS-based validation. DNS is currently available at least I believe it is -- I think I saw something about its availability recently. The issue is that I will need to write my own DNS client. This would essentially have the same distribution issue that I would need to solve with a DNS client as well, so either way new code is required.

Yep, dns went live in January. I'm not too worried about the DNS integration; we have a fairly easily-automatable DNS infrastructure owing to the fact that we're frequently changing records around. I'll have to see if we can take advantage of lego to avoid some work on our side.

You could have a very lightweight http server that only runs for the second period of time needed to communicate with the ACME server for the certificate issue Many of our servers whitelist ports to harden themselves against attacks, and this whitelisting may not be done on the server itself e.

We would also have to run some sort of HTTPd on ALL the servers in each round-robin being verified, which would essentially mean all our servers. DarcyThomas DarcyThomas 1, 1 1 gold badge 10 10 silver badges 14 14 bronze badges. Well, I would not personally roll an auth system that reuses salts at least, not weakly , just as I wouldn't roll a crypto that repeats nonce but It doesn't exactly answer the questions at hand, but it does give some advice to the IRC dev community, which often seems to turn a blind eye to idioms accepted throughout programming in all other realms: Don't needlessly reinvent the wheel , especially don't ever authenticate plaintext and use the most appropriate tool for the job Can you work on addressing the questions at hand, as opposed to the solutions?

Because right now the problem is that the development community I'm talking about seem blind to the issues and thus unwilling to fix them , and need to be made aware Sebivor My solution is to use TLS! Anything else is Overly complex, Flakly, and Insecure. I think you should take some time to read the question carefully, and identify what it is I'm asking Extract the questions, literally, copy and paste the statements which end in a question mark into notepad, and ask yourself Don't just answer the title.

There are three paragraphs. Each paragraph has a question. Show 2 more comments. David David You seem to have missed some key details. For a start, I already mentioned that we have salted forms of authentication that are unfeasible to break.

There's no need for a signed OPER, and even if there were, you seem to have neglected the entire middle paragraph of my question where I raise that the routers between the server and the oper in question may tamper with, misroute or otherwise hijack connections.

Would you mind addressing THAT part of the question? Additionally, when we talk about attacks , you need to keep in mind that attackers are opportunistic. For example, there are DNS hijack attacks that have only a slim window, perhaps making it "unlikely" as you would describe that someone would perform a successful hijacking, yet a patient attacker will be well prepared for the opportunity, right?

Would you mind addressing that in your answer, too? Do you think there might be situations where an attacker might be able to Would that still cause a reset? My understanding is that such a "gap" would be evident to the attacker in the lack of timely ACK response, allowing the attacker to Is my understanding of retransmission rules correct? I do recall being taught that TCP allows packets to be delivered out of order, and reordered by the kernel as a result.

How might this affect the likelyhood I think you meant "feasibility" or "difficulty", by the way of exploitation? Sebivor: it sounds like the answer totally misses the point for you You may have gone on a bit more of a rant than appropriate here.